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ABSTRACT
Just-in-time (JIT) is an excellent Japanese management technique. However, 
it has received criticisms about its limitation during unexpected disasters, 
especially after the Great East Japan Earthquake. Some companies prefer to 
stock as a countermeasure to the damage sustained by supply chains. Though 
the earthquake had a significant effect, is such a decision appropriate? How 
did Toyota Motor Corporation (the originator of JIT) behave in this situation? 
In this study, we address these question through an investigation of the 
inventory turnover of Toyota and its suppliers. We analyze the inventory 
turnover using statistical tests. Our results support the tendency of companies 
to increase inventory possession after an earthquake. However, a particular 
company showed a tendency to decrease its inventory. Considering the 
situation of all the suppliers when evaluating inventory control is necessary 
because the analysis is conducted at the supply chain level.
Keywords: just-in-time, inventory level change
INTRODUCTION
In March 2015, Toyota Motor Corporation (hereafter called Toyota) reported 
an annual net profit of 2 trillion yen, making them the first Japanese company 
to do so. They have sustained high sales for a long time. One of the things 
that helped with Toyota’s success was a way of thinking called just-in-time 
(JIT). Several researchers in various fields, such as business administration, 
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production control, distribution, and operations research, have studied JIT 
(also known as the Toyota Production System). Extensive research from 
the management accounting perspective has also been conducted (Cooper, 
1995; Cooper & Slagmulder, 1999; Johnson & Broms, 2008). Despite the 
volume of prior research that suggested the effectiveness of JIT, determining 
whether the essence of this methodology has been explained clearly in the 
context of accounting is difficult. For instance, while many companies 
recognize that the Toyota Production System is one of the best practices, 
very few of them have introduced this methodology. In addition, JIT has 
received several criticisms, such as suppliers face extreme disadvantages 
because they are required to be highly efficient and they face limitations 
during sudden disasters. We discuss the latter case in this study. The concept 
of reducing the quantity of inventory, which is one of the most important 
concepts in JIT, could stop the product supply when an unexpected disaster/
event occurs. 
Such incidents have been witnessed before, and the Great East Japan 
Earthquake in March 11, 2011 comes to mind quite often, in the context of 
supply chains. In other words, JIT involves a trade-off from the business 
continuity perspective, and it downplays a risk.
Japan is known as an earthquake-prone country. Thus, all areas in 
Japan are required to be prepared for earthquakes. The Great Hanshin 
Earthquake in 1995 and the Chuetsu1 earthquakes in 2004 and 2007 are still 
fresh in the memory of the Japanese people. In addition, rumors about the 
imminent occurrence of a Tonankai2 earthquake have been going around. 
Meanwhile, high-intensity earthquakes have occurred in New Guinea, 
Philippines, Pakistan, China, Iran, Indonesia, and Taiwan over the past few 
years, and in Nepal in 2015. Earthquakes have a direct and serious influence 
on the lives of the people living in the affected area. Moreover, earthquakes 
have an indirect adverse effect on many countries and areas because of the 
destruction of resources and long period of industrial stagnation. This was 
evident after the Great East Japan Earthquake, where supply chains were 
impaired.
Some companies tend to favor stock as a countermeasure to the 
damage sustained by supply chains. In short, they find holding a greater 
1 The area belonging to Niigata prefecture.
2 The peripheral area of Shizuoka, Aichi, and Mie prefectures.
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volume of inventory than before necessary to provide for unexpected 
conditions. However, this practice contradicts a key JIT concept. Does 
this mean that the earthquake influenced JIT? In this study, we investigate 
whether the Great East Japan Earthquake influenced JIT. In particular, we 
explore whether the perception on inventory possession has changed using 
accounting information.
In addition to Toyota, we include the affiliates that constitute Toyota’s 
supply chain in the analysis. We indicate that the approach toward inventory 
in the supply chain is debatable. This is why we include the affiliates in 
the analysis. In other words, even if a company increases or decreases its 
stock volume, the total stock volume in the supply chain may not fluctuate 
if another company in the chain absorbs the fluctuation. This idea is based 
on a financing research in the context of improving the cash conversion 
cycle in the supply chain. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, we present an 
overview of the extant literature. Subsequently, we perform an inter-
industry comparison, focusing on operating income, and an inter-company 
comparison in the automotive industry, where damage was greater than the 
mean. We then analyze the inventory turnover period in the Toyota Group. 
Finally, we consider the comparative results and conclude with directions 
for future research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Supply Chain Disruption and Financial Performance
In this section, we review the studies conducted by Hendricks and 
Singhal that presented the changes in various financial indicators and stock 
prices before and after supply chain disruptions. Hendricks and Singhal 
(2005, 2012) surveyed over 800 cases of supply chain disruptions from 
1989 to 2001 in the United States. The supply chain in the United States 
was disrupted by various factors, including manufacturing problems or 
parts shortages. The time spans of their analyses were 3 years, that is, the 
year before a disruption and 2 years after it. To control the differences in 
terms of company size or industry, they assigned a value to a company that 
has experienced a supply chain disruption and compared it to companies 
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with similar enterprise-wide performance trends. The results of their survey 
showed that compared to the previous year operating income decreased by 
107%, sales growth decreased by 7%, total cost increased by 11%, return 
on sales (ROS) decreased by 114%, return on assets (ROA) decreased 
by 92%, and inventory increased by 14%. In addition, they pointed out 
that approximately two years were required to recover from the effect of 
the supply chain disruptions on profitability, sales growth, and costs and 
inventories.
Additionally, they investigated the difference in the performances of 
six industries3 classified by their SIC code. They showed that a negative 
effect on the performance of all these industries existed. The decline in 
operating income and sales in the wholesale and retailing industries was 
smaller than those in the other industries because a different trend across 
industries seemed to exist. However, the authors concluded otherwise. 
Moreover, all the companies belonged to the processing industry (foods, 
tobacco, textiles, lumber, wood, furniture, paper, and chemicals), and 
manufacturing industries were not examined because their sample size was 
small. Thus, additional investigation can still be performed. Therefore, we 
investigate whether the results in the context of American companies are 
evident in Japanese companies after the 2011 earthquake.
Just-In-Time (JIT) and Disruptions
Various opinions about the relation between JIT and contingency 
exist. The Toyota Production System aims for lean manufacturing, and 
the lean supply chain of JIT may increase the risk of disruptions during 
disasters to achieve this (Whitney Luo & Heller, 2013). Possessing a large 
inventory as a safeguard against disruption could help avoid shutdowns 
(Tomlin & Wang 2010). However, this is not an entirely sound strategy 
in normal times because it prevents the early manifestations of problems, 
which is one of the characteristics of a production system. Moreover, the 
JIT competitiveness of supply and demand coordination continues (Monden, 
2012). Long-term vulnerability and redundancy of low inventory levels is 
a trade-off and corporations must decide which one to prioritize (Sheffi, 
2005). Thus, companies may have advantages in increasing or decreasing 
their inventories. In other words, they need to decide whether to emphasize 
3 The six industries were natural resources, processing, high technology, transportation, wholesale 
and retail trade, and services; these provided a certain sample size.
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the benefits of a lean production mechanism or prepare for an emergency. 
Thus, whether Toyota changed their perception after the earthquake or not 
is an important issue.
RESEARCH METHOD 
The research subjects of this study are Toyota, which is an end-product 
manufacturer, and 10 companies, which constitute Toyota’s supply chain. 
They form the “Toyota Group,” which includes the companies that are 
established or financed by Toyota Motor Corporation or Toyota Industries 
Corporation and are non-consolidated. These companies are equivalent to 
a Tier 1 company (see Appendix 1).
We extract the cost of goods sold and the inventory from the financial 
statements and quarterly reports of each company and calculate the 
turnover period of the inventory, which is calculated by dividing the total 
amount of inventory by the cost of goods sold per day.4 The amount of 
inventory is regarded as the sum of raw materials, work in progress, and 
finished products. The amount of inventory used is the value of the average 
beginning-of-quarter and end-of-quarter, while the cost of goods sold per 
day is calculated from the average values from the first quarter of fiscal 
year 2008 to the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2014. Therefore, we focus on 
how many days the companies held their inventories based on cost price.
The main objective of this study is to examine whether the inventory 
turnover period increased after the earthquake or not. This is to determine 
if the following hypothesis is correct: “Inventory turnover period did not 
fluctuate either before or after the earthquake.” We use regression analysis 
to examine the variations in the inventory turnover period of each company 
before and after the disaster, which is linearized by a least-squares method. In 
addition, we conduct a statistical test to determine whether a real difference 
between the averages of the two groups exists using paired t-test.
4 Sales could be used in the calculation of inventory days; however, while considering the number of 
days of stock, the total inventory should be calculated by dividing the average daily sales volume. 
Similarly, it is theoretically correct to use the cost of goods sold, calculated by multiplying the 
manufacturing cost, rather than sales, which is calculated by multiplying the unit price. Therefore, 
we use the cost of goods sold as the divisor in this study. See Okamoto et al. (2008, pp.45-46).
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We set the study periods to the first quarter of fiscal year 2008 to the 
third quarter of fiscal year 2010 (4.1.2008–12.31.2010; 11 samples), that 
is, before the earthquake, and from the second quarter of fiscal year 2011 
to the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2014 (7.1.2011–3.31.2015; 15 samples), 
that is, after the earthquake. All the listed companies were required to submit 
quarterly reports as per the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act in 
fiscal year 2008. The earthquake occurred on March 11, 2011; therefore, we 
excluded the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2010. In addition, the purpose of 
this research is to survey the time series transition in inventory possession. 
We do not intend to examine the circumstances in the aftermath of the 
earthquake. Therefore, we exclude the first quarter of 2011 from the survey 
because the sales situation during this quarter can be presumed abnormal.5
In the statistical analysis related to the averages, we set the period from 
the second quarter of fiscal year 2011 to the fourth quarter of fiscal year 
2013 (7.1.2011–3.31.2014; 11 samples) as the period after the earthquake 
because we need to condition the data to perform the test of average with 
a pair of specimens.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Effect on Corporate Performance before and after the 
Earthquake
Prior to the analysis, we present the damage caused by the Great 
East Japan Earthquake to various industries. We compare the financial 
performance a year before and after the earthquake for each industry to 
examine the differences in the effects that each endured. Specifically, using 
the industry average of the unconsolidated financial data published by the 
Development Bank of Japan (2012), we investigate the variations in value 
in fiscal year 2010 (a year before the earthquake) and in fiscal year 2011 
(a year after the earthquake). The compared items show variability in the 
rate of operating income, ROS, and ROA, following Hendricks and Singhal 
(2005, 2009, 2012). However, we simply compare these items with the 
average value from the previous year, whereas previous studies used the 
values to compare benchmark companies for each case. In view of the scale 
of the earthquake, similar industries are expected to have been affected 
5  See report of the first quarter 2011 (Toyota Motor Corporation, 2011, p.5.).
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correspondingly, except for regional disparities. Therefore, we examine 
the industrial trend based on actual values. The industries are sorted in 
descending order according to the rate of variability of operating income, 
as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Rate of Variability of Financial Measures by Industry
Type of Industry Operating Income ROS ROA
Electricity –185.04% –183.85% –45.48%
Transportation Equipment –148.21% –147.77% –22.47%
Printing –129.00% –131.36% –220.93%
Other Manufacturing –72.49% –70.38% –108.12%
Electrical Machinery –53.90% –50.70% –201.21%
Iron and Steel –49.53% –50.40% –101.60%
Ceramic, Stone and Clay Products –35.99% –33.54% –53.17%
Manufacture of Gas –35.41% –43.04% –41.67%
Non-ferrous Metal –30.66% –29.44% –27.00%
Plastic Products –24.28% –23.94% 22.05%
Transport –20.74% –20.53% –43.97%
Fisheries –16.83% –21.98% –53.83%
Textile –12.86% –13.79% 12.60%
Pulp and Paper –11.99% –11.69% 1402.82%
Chemical –10.56% –10.39% 12.74%
General Machinery –6.53% –8.47% –15.36%
Real Estate –4.31% 0.17% –34.43%
Construction –2.93% –6.36% –30.03%
Food –1.00% –2.38% 59.35%
Mining 2.62% 11.04% 67.37%
Rubber Products 2.69% –4.29% –13.09%
Information and Communication Electronics 3.31% 0.69% 3.09%
Retail 4.34% 6.07% –3.84%
Services 6.35% 5.10% 13.95%
Fabricated Metal Products 12.84% 9.57% 112.09%
Precision Instruments and Machinery 16.39% 14.25% –29.55%
Wholesale 27.14% 18.94% 17.85%
Petroleum 137.29% 104.74% 79.93%
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Profit and profitability decreased significantly in many industries, 
especially in the electricity, transportation equipment, and printing 
industries. However, some industries benefited, such as the petroleum and 
wholesale sectors. For the industries that witnessed a significant downturn, 
the influence of increased fuel costs and a decrease in electricity sales are 
evident. Furthermore, the decrease in nuclear power caused deterioration 
in the electricity industry, while the business environment suffered because 
of self-restraint on advertisements in the printing industry (Tokyo Electric 
Power Co., Inc., 2012, p.13; Toppan Printing Co., Ltd, 2012, p.16; Dai 
Nippon Printing Co., Ltd, 2012, p.13). Although supply chain disruptions 
are not reflected in these results, many industries suffered because of 
the earthquake. In particular, the damages to transportation equipment, 
electrical machinery, and iron and steel industries were relatively severe, 
which is consistent with the findings of Tokui, Arai, Kawasaki, Miyagawa, 
Fukao, Arai, Edamura, Kodama and Noguchi (2012), who reported that the 
automotive industries suffered more severe damage compared to the food 
and beverages, chemical products, iron and steel, general machinery, and 
electronic components industries. Automobile manufacturers are the main 
companies that constitute the transportation equipment industry. Therefore, 
the automotive industry should be targeted in this analysis.6
Inventory Turnover Period of Three Car Manufacturers 
In this section, we discuss why we focus on Toyota. Figure 1 presents 
a comparison of the three major car manufacturers in Japan, namely, Toyota, 
Nissan, and Honda, in terms of inventory turnover period in days, which is 
calculated by dividing the total amount of inventory by the cost of goods 
sold per day. Notably, the value of the average beginning-of-quarter and 
end-of-quarter is used as the amount of inventory, while the cost of goods 
sold per day is calculated from the average values from the first period of 
fiscal year 2010 to the fourth period of fiscal year 2012, following Hendricks 
and Singhal (2005). Thus, we seek to eliminate the difference in the scale 
of sales of each company that does not reflect the changes in sales volume. 
As shown in Figure 1, the inventory turnover period was 40–60 for Nissan, 
45–65 for Honda, and just 30–35 for Toyota. Toyota was clearly more 
6  In the automotive industry, where the supply chain does not have the structure of a pyramid but that 
of a diamond, the number of firms increases when moving upstream in the supply chain. Therefore, 
the effects of the decentralization of suppliers that are assumed by downstream manufacturers do 
not work well, and the damage increases (Sakaguchi and Makino, 2011, pp.81-82).
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stable with fewer variations, while Nissan and Honda had slightly larger 
variations. In addition, the inventory turnover period in Nissan tended to 
increase throughout the entire period, while that in Toyota increased slightly 
after the first quarter of fiscal year 2011. Honda’s inventory turnover period 
fell until the second quarter of fiscal year 2011, but increased subsequently. 
Figure 1: Inventory Turnover Period 
of Three Major Car Manufacturers in Japan
Figure 2 shows the inventory turnover period in the form of a line 
graph. The turnover increased around the fourth quarter of 2008, which 
must have been influenced by the decrease in the volume of sales and the 
cost of goods sold because of the economic downturn precipitated by the 
bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers. The increase from the fourth quarter of 
fiscal year 2010 to the first quarter of fiscal year 2011 indicates the influence 
of the decrease in sales caused by the earthquake.
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Figure 2: Inventory Turnover Period (Whole Period)
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 2. During 
the period before the crisis, only Toyota Motor Corp. and Toyota Industries 
Corp. witnessed a decrease in their turnover, at a .05 significance level. 
The slopes of most of the other companies are negative but nonsignificant. 
In contrast, the statistics vary in the period after the crisis. The inventory 
turnover period increase in Toyota Motor Corp., Aisin Seiki, Denso, Tokai 
Rika, Toyota Industries Corp., and Toyota Boshoku at a .01 significance 
level and in Toyoda Gosei and Toyota Tsusho at a .05 significance level. 
However, a decrease in turnover is evident in the case of the JTEKT Corp., 
at a .05 significance level.7
7  Aichi Steel Corp. also witnessed a decrease in its turnover; however, it is nonsignificant.
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Table 2: Results of Regression Analysis
Before the 
Earthquake After the Earthquake
slope P-value slope P-value
Toyota Motor Corporation –1.001 0.023 0.325 0.006
Aisan Industry Co., Ltd. 0.207 0.608 0.190 0.152
Aisin Seiki Co., Ltd. –0.579 0.180 0.243 0.005
Aichi Steel Corporation –1.401 0.331 –0.290 0.040
JTEKT Corporation 0.198 0.838 –0.306 0.318
Denso Corporation –0.249 0.461 0.574 0.000
Tokai Rika Co., Ltd. 0.259 0.477 0.317 0.007
Toyoda Gosei Co., Ltd. –0.177 0.699 0.282 0.025
Toyota Tsusho Corporation –0.664 0.398 0.400 0.041
Toyota Industries Corporation –0.791 0.040 0.627 0.000
Toyota Boshoku Corporation –0.427 0.249 0.525 0.000
Finally, the analysis results related to the difference in the averages 
are presented in Table 3. The mean significantly increases in Toyoda Gosei 
at a .01 significance level, in Aisan Industry and Denso at a .05 level, and 
in Toyota Industries Corp. at a .1 level. In contrast, the mean significantly 
decreases in the JTEKT Corp., at a .05 significance level. The actual value 
of the inventory turnover period of each company is shown in Appendix II.
Table 3: Paired t-test
Average Inventory 
Turnover Period in Days t-Test
Before the 
earthquake
After the 
earthquake
p-Value 
(one sided 
test)
t-Value
Toyota Motor Corporation 35.43 32.97 0.123 1.231
Aisan Industry Co., Ltd. 34.79 38.45 0.015 –2.515
Aisin Seiki Co., Ltd. 29.68 28.25 0.192 0.912
Aichi Steel Corporation 74.73 64.73 0.014 2.556
JTEKT Corporation 59.98 58.59 0.324 0.470
Denso Corporation 37.52 41.68 0.010 –2.741
Tokai Rika Co., Ltd. 26.60 27.29 0.306 –0.524
Toyoda Gosei Co., Ltd. 23.13 29.42 0.001 –4.398
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Average Inventory 
Turnover Period in Days t-Test
Before the 
earthquake
After the 
earthquake
p-Value 
(one sided 
test)
t-Value
Toyota Tsusho 
Corporation 29.42 29.21 0.473 0.069
Toyota Industries 
Corporation 29.71 32.48 0.054 –1.763
Toyota Boshoku 
Corporation 12.04 11.95 0.478 0.056
DISCUSSION
The results of the analyses seem to support the hypothesis: inventory 
turnover period fluctuates after the earthquake. We present arguments in 
favor of this conclusion. First, a clear difference is acknowledged in the 
variations in inventory turnover period before and after the earthquake. 
Although the tendency to decrease before the earthquake cannot be explicitly 
stated (because many companies did not have significant results), we show 
that it remains at the same level. Moreover, the tendency to increase is not 
confirmed. The increase in turnover around the fourth quarter of fiscal year 
2008 may have been caused by the cost of goods sold (the denominator in 
the calculation), which is the result of the global recession precipitated by 
the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in 2008. Although the amount of inventory 
also decreases during the same period, the decline in the cost of goods sold 
is more pronounced. We deduce that the companies attempted to adjust the 
amount of inventory in response to the change in demand. However, they 
were unable to absorb the remarkable decrease in unit sales or they expected 
the decrease in unit sales to be a short-term fluctuation and continued to 
produce in anticipation of future sales.
Second, the inventory turnover period increased in all the surveyed 
companies in the period from the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2010 (including 
the day of the earthquake) to the first quarter of fiscal year 2011. This was 
caused by the increase in stock with the production stop in factories and part 
suppliers and the decrease in sales (cost price) that occurred because of the 
reduction in domestic demand. However, most of the surveyed companies 
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are concentrated in the Chubu region around the Aichi prefecture, and they 
did not have to dispose of their stock because of the direct influence of the 
earthquake or tsunami.
After July 2011, when the production system is mostly restored 
(which is one of the most noticeable periods in this research), the increase 
in inventory turnover period is significant. Over half the companies show 
significant increases, at a .01 significance level. 
In terms of the long-term influence of supply chain distortions, our 
results support the conclusions of prior studies. However, we cannot ignore 
the fact that the turnover of two companies decrease after the earthquake, 
namely, the Aichi Steel Corp. and the JTEKT Corp. In particular, the 
decrease in turnover of the Aichi Steel Corp. is statistically significant. 
Both these companies held stock for approximately 55 to 70 days, while 
the other eight companies (except Toyota Boshoku, which held remarkably 
little stock) changed stock within 25 to 50 days. Thus, these two companies 
held relatively more stock compared to the other companies in the group (see 
Figure 2 and Appendix 2). That is, no company simply decided to increase 
the quantity of stock or to increase the inventory turnover period compared 
to the situation before the earthquake. Apart from the question of whether 
the tendency to increase inventory is intentional or not, the standard seems 
to converge from 40 to 50 days in the Toyota Group. Thus, this indicates that 
the tendency to increase inventory after the earthquake does not contradict 
the key concept of JIT, rather, risk aversion (to prepare for an emergency 
such as a production stop) is considered more than before.
Finally, we narrow down the companies that show noticeable 
fluctuation based on the results of the paired t-test. Four companies, namely, 
Aisan Industry, Denso, Toyoda Gosei, and Toyota Industry, show tendencies 
to increase inventory, while the Aichi Steel Corp. shows a marked tendency 
to decrease compared to the other companies. The findings of this study 
could be validated through further inspections of these companies.
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CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we examine the tendency of inventory possession before 
and after the Great East Japan Earthquake. The inventory turnover period 
decreases in the period before the earthquake according to the consolidated 
accounting information of the Toyota Motor Corp.. In contrast, a significant 
tendency to increase inventory turnover period is evident after the 
earthquake. Though the average number of days decreases, the result is 
nonsignificant. Meanwhile, the tendency to increase inventory possession 
is evident after an earthquake in most of the companies that constitute the 
supply chain of the Toyota Motor Corp. Moreover, one company increased 
the mean of the inventory turnover period significantly. However, the 
company that had relatively more stock showed a tendency to decrease.
In view of these results, we need to consider the situation of all 
suppliers when evaluating inventory control because the analysis is 
conducted at the supply chain level,. Moreover, results such as those in 
the context of the Toyota Group must be regarded as an indication of the 
transformation or evolution of the JIT methodology. In other words, JIT may 
be required to determine the most suitable inventory level after considering 
the management of a wide range of suppliers in the supply chain, the 
procurement of a variety of parts, elements, such as correspondence to an 
unexpected situation, and so on in the future.
Finally, we discuss the limitations of this study and present directions 
for future research. In this study, we are not able to collect and examine 
information related to what kind of inventory was increased or to examine 
whether the targeted value of the inventory turnover period existed and 
whether the rate of increase was controlled. In addition, the future transition 
is not clarified, that is, whether the tendency to increase reaches the ceiling or 
converges. To address these limitations, continuous and qualitative research 
would be required. Moreover, the data that we collected for the statistical 
analysis are restrictive, and the number of samples is limited. Future research 
could validate the findings of this study through multidirectional analysis 
using other techniques.
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2014_1st 2014_2nd 2014_3nd 2014_4nd
Toyota Motor Corporation 35.9418 36.9113 35.2524 34.8550
Aisan Industry Co., Ltd. 42.5725 41.4729 42.3561 39.8896
Aisin Seiki Co., Ltd. 29.3371 30.1425 31.3821 32.1354
Aichi Steel Corporation 63.1817 64.3045 65.9390 63.0911
JTEKT Corporation 55.7635 54.2264 56.6038 53.2916
Denso Corporation 45.1044 46.7916 48.8911 46.3037
Tokai Rika Co., Ltd. 30.1854 29.9935 31.7852 31.5091
Toyoda Gosei Co., Ltd. 31.0465 31.7346 32.6363 32.6053
Toyota Tsusho Corporation 29.7917 28.4644 30.6163 31.4038
Toyota Industries Corporation 36.5159 37.9768 39.6093 36.6990
Toyota Boshoku Corporation 15.7711 15.5293 16.0280 14.9001
